Abstract In this article, we establish a model of competitive insurance markets based on Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) where insurers can perform risk classification tests either before insurance contracts are issued (underwriting) or when coverage claims are filed (post-loss test). However, insurers cannot pre-commit to performing either test in the insurance application period since the tests are costly type-verifications. We derive the perfect Bayesian equilibrium of four cases: no test is used; only one kind of the two types of test is performed; and both tests are performed. The space of parameters where the equilibrium exists in Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) and Picard (2009) 
Introduction
As a key component in contract theory, adverse selection has received significant attention both theoretically and empirically. Since the seminal work by Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) , a large body of literature has been presented with focus on various aspects of how insurance mechanisms deal with adverse selection and risk classification.
Generally, there are two kinds of screening mechanisms in the insurance market. The first one is risk classification based on prior information and is termed underwriting since the screening relies on the insurers' effort to categorize risk types before insurance policies are issued. The second screening mechanism is a test after an insurance claim is filed and thus is called post-loss test. Post-loss test is needed to ensure compliance with the principle of utmost good faith or uberrimae fidei. Because insurers rely on the truthfulness of policyholder's statements in determining their risk classifications, they have the legal right to void the contract should those statements found to be materially false.
Typically insurers discover misstatements post loss, during claims investigations.
In literature, the two kinds of risk-classification mechanisms are studied separately. Risk classification using prior information has received extensive attention (e.g. Hoy (1982) , Doherty and Thistle (1996) , Hoy and Polborn (2000) , Hoy and Lambert (2000) , and so on). Browne and Kamiya (2012) , for instance, theoretically show that an equilibrium (either in Nash type or Wilson type) may exist where insurers offer full coverage even to low-risk type by virtue of committing to an underwriting test instead of simply relying on self-selection.
1 The original work on post-loss tests by Dixit (2000) discusses how costly investigation of risk type after the claim (post-loss auditing) affects the Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) separating equilibrium. 2 Modifying the model by Dixit (2000) , Dixit and Picard (2003) relax the assumption that individuals do not have perfect private information about their risk type. As an important extension, Picard (2009) allows insurers not to commit to the costly verification. Under certain conditions, Picard (2009) shows that a semi-separating equilibrium in the sense of perfect Bayesian equilibrium exists in the insurance market when insurers cannot commit to post-loss testing. Lando (2016) extends Dixit (2000) by investigating the degree to which legal constraints of misrepresentation should be enforced by insurers due to cost-benefit tradeoff. Lando's perspective is primarily legal rather than economic.
The purpose of this paper is to merge the two lines of inquiry by incorporating underwriting and 1 Hence, an insurer's effort at gathering private information, together with successful testing, may make the first-best outcome possible in Browne and Kamiya (2012) .
2 He shows that the insurer's ability of post-loss auditing could substantially improve the chance of attaining separating equilibrium and find that uberrimae fidei achieves a Pareto improvement compared with the allocation in Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) .
post-loss testing without commitment in one unified framework and to investigate the effects of both tests on the equilibrium in a competitive insurance market. We establish our model on the familiar economy described in Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) , where individual risk type is private information and each insurer is able to supply at least one kind of insurance contract in a competitive market. In our model, the insurers design insurance contracts for high-risk type and low-risk type individuals. An underwriting test is performed before issuance of insurance contracts on individuals who apply for the contract designed for low-risk type. If a high-risk type individual is found to be misrepresenting his or her type in underwriting, the application is cancelled 3 and he or she is faced with a fee charged by the insurer so as to make up the cost of underwriting. After a loss, the individuals claim coverage from their insurers. The insurers can conduct post-loss tests on the insureds who file claims of contract of low-risk type. If a high-risk type individual is found to have misrepresented his or her type in the post-loss test, the insurance premium is refunded and the insurance coverage is voided; a potential fine may be charged as in Picard (2009) . We assume that both underwriting and post-loss tests are costly type-verifications, and that the insurers cannot commit to either test. Thus, our model embeds a simplified version of Picard (2009) 4 , and extends Browne and Kamiya (2012) into underwriting without commitment. Furthermore, we model underwriting and post-loss tests simultaneously and
show the effects of both tests on equilibrium. Intuitively, through underwriting, the insureds' risk types may become common knowledge and the proportion of the insureds who need to be screened in the post-loss test may be reduced. As a result, the insurers' strategy on post-loss testing will be affected by underwriting. In an extreme, post-loss tests will be crowded out by underwriting and vice versa. Therefore, it is important to examine the interesting interaction between underwriting and post-loss test, especially when commitment is not made to either.
Since the tests in our model are not committed to by the insurers, we model our economy in a framework of a perfect Bayesian game. In the perfect Bayesian equilibrium, every insurer makes at leat non-negative profit while there is no other contracts that, if provided, could generate positive profit and improve the utility of at least one risk type. The equilibrium is actually a second-best Pareto equilibrium 5 . We show that if the equilibrium exists, there are four cases of equilibria depending on 3 In reality, the insurers can decide not to accept the risk and thus deny insurance after underwriting. And in our model, cancelation is without loss of generality since it can be replaced by some exogenous contract. See footnote 8 for details. 4 The simplification mainly lies in that we consider symmetry in strategies of both the insurers and the insureds.
That is, in the equilibrium, all insurers designs the same contract for each type and that the individuals are evenly distributed among insurers in the market. Hence, the insurers cannot infer form the applications the risk types of the applicants. Picard (2009) assumes a finite number of insurers who serve heterogeneous samples of insureds. 5 The term second-best refers to the fact that adverse-selection cannot be eliminated unless the cost of either test is null.
the fraction of high-risk type individuals in the market and the pair of cost parameters. Conditional on both tests being of sufficiently high cost, neither test will be used by the insurers since they are prohibitively expensive. In this case, the equilibrium depends on the fraction of high-risk type individuals in the market. As in Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) and Picard (2009) , if the fraction of high-risk type individuals in the market is sufficiently low, an equilibrium may not exist. While if the fraction of high-risk type individuals in the market is sufficiently large, and if the costs of both tests are high, the equilibrium coincides with the separating equilibrium in Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) where the high-risk type individuals receive an actuarially fairly priced full insurance contract while the low-risk type individuals receive a partial insurance contract. As long as either cost of the tests is sufficiently low, an equilibrium always exists. In this case, the test with relatively low testing cost will be performed with positive probability but less than one to make the high-risk type randomize between the two types of contracts. The equilibrium, therefore, is semi-separating equilibrium. In particular, when the cost of the post-loss test is relatively low, the equilibrium allocation coincides with that in Picard (2009) where the contract for high-risk type is an actuarially fairly priced full insurance contract while that for low-risk type individuals provides overinsurance. When the cost of underwriting is relatively low, we establish a new semi-separating equilibrium where the contract for high-risk type is an actuarially fairly priced full insurance contract and that for low-risk type may be either overinsurance, full insurance, or underinsurance, depending on the relationship between the fee collected from misrepresenting individuals and the underwriting cost. Thus, we partially solve the puzzle of overinsurance contract with only post-loss test in Picard (2009) , since overinsurance disagrees with the principal of indemnity in insurance practice. Importantly, we derive necessary and sufficient conditions under which both underwriting and post-loss tests are used in the market equilibrium. The resulting contract for low-risk type in this case provides overinsurance and that for high-risk type remains the actuarially fairly priced full insurance contract. In summary, we extend the parameter space in which the equilibrium exists in Rothschild and Stiglitz insurance market and thus contributes to literature.
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present our model economy in details. Section 3 solves the Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium. A summary of our findings, as well as concluding remarks, is contained in Section 4.
Model Environment
Consider the market environment originally described in Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) likelihoods: for a high-risk type (h-type for short) individual, the accident occurs with probability π h , while for a low-risk type (l-type for short) individual, the accident occurs with probability π l ; 0 < π l < π h < 1. Individuals know their risk type but insurers do not. Both parties know the probability of loss and the proportion of h-type individuals λ and that of l-type individuals 1 − λ in the market. An insurance contract C contains two dimensions denoted by (k, x), where k is the insurance premium and x is indemnity less premium.
We assume that both underwriting and the post-loss test are accurate but costly risk verifications.
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Cost for each underwriting is c 1 and that for each post-loss test is c 2 . If the tests are of positive cost, no insurer can pre-commit to them. On one hand, if the high-risk type individuals conjecture that underwriting (post-loss test) is performed on every applicant (policyholder who files claim) of the contract intended for low-risk type, they will self-select the separating contract of high-risk type to avoid insurance contract cancellation. On the other hand, if the insurers are aware of the game theory prediction that the insureds' choices lead to a separating equilibrium, neither test will be conducted in order to save cost. Therefore, the assumption of underwriting and post-loss testing without commitment is reasonable and realistic.
The game is played sequentially in the following steps:
Step 1 Nature assigns risk type to each individual. With probability λ, an individual is h-type, and with probability 1 − λ, an individual is l-type. Only the individuals know their risk type.
Step 2 The insurers design insurance in the competitive market. In particular, they design a contract
) for h-type individuals and a conditional contract C l = (k l , x l ) with underwriting 6 The competitive market means that it is free for insurers to enter or exit the market and in the equilibrium, no insurer is able to extract positive profit. 7 An alternative way to modeling probabilistic tests is to assume that the tests are not accurate, and the accuracy of the tests is linked with the testing costs by some one-to-one mapping, just like the setting in Browne and Kamiya (2012) . The choice variable then would become the costs of the tests instead of the probabilities of the tests. This alternative setting will not essentially change the model implications.
test which is oriented towards l-type individuals. The conditional contract C l stipulates that, for any applicant of contract C l , the insurers decide whether to perform the underwriting test.
If the underwriting test is performed, the insurers may adjust the contract based on the result of the test: if the applicant is h-type, the insurers cancel the contract for the misrepresenting individual 8 and charge a fee G ≥ 0 in addition 9 , and if the applicant belongs to l-type, the contract remains C l . Once underwriting is performed, the type of the individual being tested becomes common knowledge. And the misrepresenting individuals whose contracts are cancelled cannot apply for other contracts.
Step 3 Being aware of the details of the contracts, individuals decide whether to purchase insurance, and if they are going to purchase, which one they will choose. Each individual can apply for only one contract, but can randomize between the contracts. That is, the h-type individuals may apply for C l with probability σ hl and for C h with probability 1 − σ hl . Similarly, the l-type individuals may apply for C l with probability σ ll and for C h with probability 1 − σ ll .
Step 4 Based on applications, the insurers decide their underwriting strategy and adjust conditional contracts. 10 Specifically, insures may perform underwriting with probability p 1 . Premiums or fees are paid after underwriting.
Step 5 Nature decides whether an accident happens for an individual. For h-type, the accident happens with probability π h , and for l-type, the accident happens with probability π l . Those who suffer from accidents claim coverage from their insurers.
Step 6 Based on the claims, the insurers decide whether to perform post-loss test for policy holders of C l who are not tested in underwriting. In particular, the post-loss test can be performed with probability p 2 . Based on the result of the post-loss test, the insurers pay indemnity in case of l-type or cancel the contract in case of h-type. If the contract is canceled, the premium is refunded by the insurer, and the misrepresenting individual suffers from an additional fine F ≥ 0, collected by a third party like the government.
8 Here, the assumption of cancellation of the application in case of a misrepresenting individual in underwriting can be substituted by exogenously rendering that individual with an insurance contract that breaks even by itself. This contract plus a fee charged must deliver the misrepresenting individual expected utility less than that derived by contract C h , since appropriate penalty is necessary in underwriting in our model. For simplicity, we assume no contract updated here. Endogenizing an updated contract for the misrepresenting individual in underwriting causes potential difficulty and is discussed in the concluding section. 9 We model the underwriting fee by referring to Browne and Kamiya (2012) . 10 Note that we have assumed that once underwriting is performed, the type of the individual being tested becomes common knowledge in Step 2. However, this may rise the issue of free-riding the underwriting test for the insurers. To simplify the problem, we make the insurers commit to their underwriting strategies so as to preclude free-riding.
We denote by U l (C) the expected utility of l-type derived from contract C before underwriting and by U h (C) the expected utility of h-type derived from contract C before underwriting respectively.
The Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium
The perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the above game is defined by achieving four standards: First, given the insurers' contracts, the individuals choose insurance demand σ hl and σ ll to maximize their expected utility. Second, the insurers' testing strategies p 1 and p 2 must maximize expected profits (or equivalently minimize expected payments in case of post-loss test). Third, the contracts C h and C l generate at least non-negative profits for the insurers who provide the corresponding contract. Lastly, the insurers form beliefs about the proportion of h-type individuals who apply for contract C l in Step 4, denoted by μ 1 , and that of the proportion of h-type individuals who claim for indemnity but are not tested in underwriting in Step 6, denoted by μ 2 .
11 Beliefs should be consistent with the choices of the individuals.
If there is no other equilibrium allocation with non-negative profit that can improve the utility of either the h-type or the l-type, we say that the perfect Bayesian equilibrium is also second-best Pareto-optimal. In addition, with little loss of generality, we consider a symmetric equilibrium which means that in the equilibrium insurers supply the same contract for a given type and that the insureds distribute evenly among all the insurers. In this case, no insurer can infer from the sample of customers on the risk type of any individual in that sample. In this paper, we consider the second-best Paretooptimal perfect Bayesian equilibrium that is also symmetric and simply term it as equilibrium.
The following lemmas can be directly obtained from the environment.
Lemma 1. There is no pooling equilibrium.
Proof. Firstly, underwriting would not be utilized in a pooling equilibrium should it exist to save testing cost and improve the utility of at least one risk type. 12 Then Dixit (2000) and Picard (2009) has demonstrated that there is no pooling equilibrium without underwriting.
As shown in Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) , although a pooling contract cannot form an equilibrium in Nash sense, it can upset other potential equilibria if it provides higher utility for both types. Next,
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The insurers also need to form belief of the proportion of the l-type individuals show apply for C h in Step 4.
However, we can show in Lemma 4 that the l-type individuals will not pool with h-type in contract C h . So, the insurers' belief of the proportion of the l-type individuals who apply for C h is 0. 12 Although it is tempting to think that if the insurers could charge sufficiently large fee G, they would have more incentive to increase probability of underwriting, however, this effect will be offset by the h-risk type individuals' decreasing incentive to apply for contract C l due to the fear of no insurance plus a fee. Thus, should a pooling contract emerges in an equilibrium, underwriting would not be used.
we assume that the equilibrium exists without a pooling contract, and introduce the pooling contract when identifying the equilibrium after we solve the contracts in different cases.
Lemma 2. The utility for h-type individuals must be at least U h (C * h ) in the equilibrium, where C * h is the separating contract in Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) ; see Figure 1 .
Proof. Since the contract C * h breaks even, any insurer is able to supply contract C * h to attract h-type. So the least utility for h-type cannot be lower than U h (C * h ).
Lemma 3. There cannot be cross-subsidies between contracts C h and C l in the equilibrium.
Proof. Because the insurers operate in a competitive market, if there is cross-subsidy between contracts C h and C l , then any insurer as a new entrant may only choose to provide one contract that generates positive profit, upsetting the original equilibrium in Step 2. Proof. If underwriting is not used, Picard (2009) has shown that σ ll = 1. If underwriting is used,
, h-type individuals will not apply for C l . In this case, underwriting is inefficient and thus insurers will choose
, then all h-type individuals will apply
). By Lemma 3, C h and C l must break even respectively. So C h is on line EL in Figure 1 while C l is located below EL. For contract C l , since underwriting is used, the underwriting cost of l-type individuals who apply for C l must be subsidized by the net gains from fees (namely fees less payments and cost) derived from h-type individuals, that is
otherwise, underwriting is inefficient and will not be used. There exist a contract C l with double deviation of increasing probability of underwriting test Figure 1 generates positive profit and upsets the original equilibrium, a contraction. So we must have
Lemma 5. In the equilibrium, C h = C * h , and
Proof. Since only h-type individuals will apply for C h , Lemma 2 and 3 imply that
, then all h-type individuals would apply for contract C l , resulting in a pooling equilibrium. So by Lemma 1, we must have U h (C l ) = U h (C * h ) and h-type individuals can randomize between C h and C l . Based on the above deduction, the profit for contract C h is:
which means expected income from premium less expected claim payment. The profit from l-type for contract C l is:
where additional cost of tests are deducted. And the profit from h-type for contract C l is:
wherein if the insurers do not perform underwriting, their profit is
and when they perform underwriting, they have to pay cost c 1 but are able to collect fee G from the misrepresenting h-type individual.
According to Bayesian rule, the insurers' belief about the proportion of of the h-type individuals who are not tested in underwriting and claim for indemnity in Step 6 is:
The belief is irrelevant to the insurers' underwriting strategy due to the assumption that once underwriting is performed the type of the individual being tested becomes common knowledge. Then the expected payment of the post-loss test is:
Lemma 1 in Picard (2009) demonstrates that p 2 must be lower than 1 for c 2 > 0. Otherwise, all h-type individuals passing themselves off as l-type would be verified and faced with fines. They would be better off choosing contract C h . Then σ hl and thus μ 2 will be 0, and for the insurers providing C l , it is optimal to choose p 2 = 0 to minimize the payment of the post-loss test. Thus, when the post-loss test is performed with positive probability, the expected payment of no testing must be equal to that of testing, that is:
or equivalently
Based on the reasoning above, we always have:
which means that in the optimal post-loss testing strategy, the expected payment of post-loss test is always equal to the insurance indemnity less premium.
The insurers' belief about the proportion of h-type individuals who apply for C l in Step 4 is:
Then the expected profit 13 of the underwriting is:
is the expected profit of contract without underwriting or either test, and p 1 c 1 − μ 1 G + μ 1 (1 − π h )k l − π h x l stands for the net cost of underwriting: for each underwriting test, cost c 1 is paid and profit μ 1 (1 − π h )k l − π h x l cannot be collected due to the cancellation of the misrepresenting individual's contract. However, expected fee μ 1 G can be recovered in case of cancellation. Clearly, if underwriting is entirely free, i.e. c 1 = 0, then insurers will perform underwriting with probability 1. In this case, all h-type individuals will only apply for contract C h and the first-best contract C * l (see Figure 1 ) could be offered in the market to attract all l-type individuals, resulting in a first-best allocation. However, similar to the post-loss test, the following lemma shows that the underwriting will not be performed almost surely if the cost of underwriting is positive.
Proof. If p 1 = 1, then all the h-type individuals misrepresenting themselves as l-type will be revealed and culminate in cancellation of insurance policies. Their expected utility of no insurance plus a fee 13 In the post-loss test, the income from premium has been determined in Step 4 and the decision whether to perform post-loss test cannot change income part. Thus, the optimal strategy of post-loss test is to minimize the expected payment of post-loss test. For underwriting, on the other hand, since it is performed ex ante and finding an misrepresenting individual results in cancellation of the contract, the strategy of underwriting affects income from premium. So, we have to consider expected profit.
G is lower than U h (C * h ). So, h-type individuals will apply for C h only. Knowing that the equilibrium is separating, the insurers will not perform underwriting since it is costly, a contraction. Now without loss of generality, we focus on the case of c 1 > 0 and c 2 > 0 in the analysis and keep it in mind that in case of either c 1 = 0 or c 2 = 0, the first-best allocation can be achieved. For underwriting to be performed with positive probability, the profit of no underwriting must equal that of underwriting, namely,
This means that the condition on which underwriting is performed is that the cost of underwriting is exactly covered by the expected revenue of the test. And for underwriting not to be performed, the profit of underwriting must be no larger than that of no underwriting:
Since the utility of h-type individuals is fixed by Lemma 5 at U h (C * h ), any contract in the equilibrium must maximize the utility of l-type to preclude their deviation. Thus, solving the second-best Pareto-optimal equilibrium is equivalent to solving the following problem:
with respect to C l , σ hl , and p 1 , p 2 , and subject to the following restrictions: The resource constraint:
The constraint for optimal underwriting: if p 1 = 0, then equation (13) must hold, and if p 1 > 0, then equation (12) must hold; μ 1 is defined in (9). The constraint for optimal post-loss test: if p 2 > 0, then equation (7) must hold, and if p 2 = 0, then
where μ 2 is defined in (4). And finally the participation constraint for h-type based on Lemma 5:
where
and
Note that we already have C h = C * h by Lemma 5, so the resource constraint (15) can be reduced to:
4 The Solution to the Equilibrium
The solution to the equilibrium depends on the parameters π h , π l , λ, c 1 , c 2 , G, and F . In order to distinguish between different cases, we first impose restrictions on the insurers' choices of the two tests and then identify the equilibrium by reintroducing a pooling contract and comparing value function
Solutions under Restrictions on the Tests
Clearly, there are four cases depending on whether either, both, or neither test is in use. Two cases wherein underwriting is not used have been discussed in the literature, and we summarize them in the following proposition.
Proposition 1. If the restriction that p 1 = p 2 = 0 is imposed on problem (14), then the solution is
l , σ hl = 0, and σ ll = 1.
14 If the restrictions that p 1 = 0 but p 2 > 0 are imposed on problem (14), then the solution is
. The contracts C * h and C * * l are separating contracts for h-type and l-type respectively in Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) . And the contractĈ l is the semi-separating contract in Picard (2009) which provides overinsurance if c 2 > 0.
The remaining two cases involve underwriting with positive probability, p 1 > 0. We first present a conclusion similar to Lemma 2 in Picard (2009) , that is the testing strategy of either underwriting or post-loss test will not enter into the resource constraint.
Lemma 7. When p 1 > 0, the resource constraint can be reduced into:
Proof. If p 1 > 0 and p 2 = 0, then by (9) and (12), the insurers' belief about the proportion of h-type individuals applying for contract C l is:
Substitute (22) into (20), we have (21). If p 1 > 0 and p 2 > 0, then by (4) and (7), we have:
in addition to (22). Substitute (22) and (23) into (20), we have (21).
Now consider the case of only using underwriting. The resource constraint (21) combined with (22) is equivalent to:
Denote (24) by ψ(k l , x l ) = 0. It is easy to show that the above equation represents a hyperbola on the state space. 15 To solve (14), we have the first order condition:
Equation (24) together with equation (25), potentially determines a contract, denoted byC l . However, for the solved contractC l to be an interior solution in the restricted problem, σ hl calculated in (22) must be less than 1 to exclude pooling equilibrium with underwriting, which implies that:
For λ that is sufficiently small, the contractC l cannot satisfy condition (26), resulting in a corner solution. Define:λ
where (k l ,x l ) solves system (24) and (25) .
Thenλ is the maximum λ such that σ hl = 1. As long as λ >λ, the solution to problem (14) where only underwriting is used is an interior solution so that σ hl ∈ (0, 1). The problem is solved in the following proposition.
Proposition 2. Assume that the restrictions that p 1 > 0 and p 2 = 0 are imposed on problem (14).
There existsλ(c 1 ; π h , π l , G) defined in (27), such that when λ >λ, then
Note that the discriminant of (24) is equal to
. The contracts C * h is separating contracts for h-type in Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) . And the contract C l is solved by system (24) and (25). Besides, if c 1 > G, the contractC l provides overinsurance such thatk l +x l > A. If c 1 = G, the contractC l provides full insurance such thatk l +x l = A. And if c 1 < G, the contractC l provides underinsurance such thatk l +x l < A.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Proposition 2 states that when the insurers cannot commit to underwriting, underwriting will be performed such that h-type individuals are indifferent between contract C * h andC l ; hence, htype individuals will randomize between the two contracts. The Bayesian game requires that the insurers' belief of the h-type individuals' demand for contractC l be consistent with their strategy.
Thus, σ hl is determined by (22). The equilibrium with underwriting, if it exist, will be a semiseparating equilibrium. Different from the over coverage contractĈ l with only post-loss test derived in Picard (2009) , the contract with underwriting may take the form of diverse coverage depending on the relationship between the test cost c 1 and fees collected from misrepresenting individuals G.
Intuitively, the fee has two effects: on one hand, given σ hl , a large amount of fees charged would relax the budget constraint of insurers who supply contractC l and thus may prospectively enable them to provide more coverage. On the other hand, a large amount of fee prohibits h-type individuals from applying for contractC l , resulting in a lower σ hl . Proposition 2 shows that the latter effect dominates and thus, when fee level G increases, the optimal contractC l turns from overinsurance to underinsurance. When G = c 1 , the insurers charge exactly the testing cost for the misrepresenting individuals. In this case, the resource constraint (21) is parallel to the fair-odds line of l-type, so contractC l provides full insurance. Moreover, we show in the Appendix that no matter how large G is, as long as c 1 > 0, the resource constraint ψ(W N − W 1 , W 2 − W A ) = 0 is always below the fair-odds line of l-type. Thus, the contractC l is second-best. While it is an empirical question on whether in practice the insurers charge more fee than underwriting cost to misrepresenting individuals, we expect that the case of G > c 1 seems to be more realistic in light of the principal of indemnity. An important question is whether problem (14) can be solved under the restriction that both p 1 and p 2 are positive since in reality, more often than not, both tests are utilized together. Conditional on performing underwriting, Proposition 1 has solved the contractĈ l for l-type where post-loss test is used and Proposition 2 has solved the contractC l for l-type where underwriting is used. It is natural to speculate that a candidate solution to problem (14) where both underwriting and post-loss test are used must be the one whereĈ l andC l coincide. Formally, two conditions should be satisfied if both tests are used. Condition 1. The insurers' belief on the proportion of h-type individuals who apply for contract C l in underwriting must be consistent with that in post-loss testing in the sense that they are based on the same expected strategy of the h-type applicants:
The first condition is derived from the rationality assumption of the Bayesian game's participants and states that at the optimal contract C l , the two resource constraints match their values (by either intersection or tangency). The second condition reinforces the first condition by introducing a smoothpasting condition.
Condition 2. For a contract that incorporates either test to be second-best Pareto-optimal, the corresponding resource constraint of either test must be tangent to the l-type individuals' indifference curve, and they share the same point of tangency, which requires that two resource constraints
, k l , x l ) = 0 must be tangent to each other at the optimal contract C l .
Should the second condition fail, that is when the two resource constraints intersect at the optimal contract for l-type, the insurers would be able to extract positive profit by deviating to a contract that incorporates only one test and dominates the one that incorporates both tests. Since this deviation can also improve at least l-type, it is feasible. In Figure 3 , we plot a case where Condition 2 fails. In this figure, the resource constraint with post-loss test intersects with that with underwriting at the optimal contract with underwritingC l . There exists a contract C l which incorporates only post-loss test that, if provided, can generate positive profit and attract all l-type individuals. This contract thus upsets contractC l . So, for an equilibrium with both tests to exist, Condition 2 is necessary. The following lemma is a direct implication of the second condition and Proposition 2. Then Proportion 2 implies that this is only the case of c 1 > G.
Given general parameters, problem (14) with p 1 > 0 and p 2 > 0 cannot be solved due to stringent constraints. Assume that the slope of the indifference curve of the l-type that is tangent to resource
. Then Condition 2 means that:
where Ξ σ , Ξ k l , and Ξ x l denote the partial derivative of Ξ with respect to the first, second, and third argument respectively, and that system:
has one and only untrivial solution, which is equivalent to one equation on parameters 16 :
This equation, denoted by ϕ(c 1 , c 2 ) = 0, together with (28) and (29), forms a system of four equations.
Thus the contract (k l , x l ) can be solved only with special parameters. Conditional on it is solved, there exists a pair of cost parameters (c 1 ,c 2 ) with π h , π l , and G being free parameters, that guarantee the existence of the solution to the system. 17 Conversely, given
the system of four equations (28), (29), and (31) can be solved by some contract. We identify the contract by finding the sufficient conditions imposed on parameters, in particular the pair (c 1 ,c 2 ), under which an optimal contract, denoted byC l , that solves (24) and (25), also satisfies Condition 1 and Condition 2 (namely equations (28), (29), and (31)). Formally, we have the following proposition.
Proposition 3. Assume that λ >λ. Denote byC l a contract that solves (24) and (25) such that:
If problem (14) with restrictions p 1 > 0 and p 2 > 0 can be solved by C l =C l , then the cost parameters must be determined by (c 1 , c 2 ) = (c 1 ,c 2 ) which are solutions to a system 18 combing
16 See details for this equation in the Appendix.
17 Note that the solution does not explicitly depend on parameters F and λ if λ >λ. 18 Note that s depends on c 1 and thus is endogenously determined. So equation (35) in the system is highly nonlinear.
such that (c 1 ,c 2 ) are above G,
, and (34) and (35) exist, and problem (14) with p 1 > 0 and p 2 > 0 is solved by
. The contracts C * h is separating contracts for h-type in Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) .
The first part of Proposition 3 gives necessary conditions of cost parameters (c 1 , c 2 ) when both underwriting and post-loss tests are used. The second part of Proposition 3 provides sufficient conditions imposed on parameters such that the solution to problem (14) with underwriting solved in Proposition 2 can also allow for post-loss testing and thus both tests are used. It can be seen from Proposition 3 that although underwriting and post-loss testing are commonly used together, their co-existence in the Rothschild and Stiglitz insurance market is highly demanding if the insurers can commit to neither test: only when cost parameters satisfy specific conditions can the problem be solved with both tests. And from the proof of Proposition 2, it can be shown that Figure 4 , we plot an example in which a contractC l solves problem (14) with both tests. Conditional on it is solved, the optimal contractC l is located where the contract with underwriting and the contract with post-loss test coincide and it provides over coverage. The equation U h (C * h ) = U h (C l ) specifies testing probabilities p 1 and p 2 . However, there are infinite numbers of paris of (p 1 , p 2 ) such that U h (C * h ) = U h (C l ). Since the insurance contract can be purchased only once at Step 3, and those whose contracts are cancelled cannot apply for other contracts (no renegotiation), any pair of testing probabilities that can provide h-type individuals with expected utility of U h (C * h ) make the h-type indifferent and so for the insurers who provide the contract due to Lemma 7. Therefore, the solution supports the equilibrium which is still semi-separating. 
Identification of the Equilibrium
Until now, we have solved problem (14) in four cases. When no tests are used, the optimal contract for l-type is the separating contract C * * l in Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) . When only post-loss test is used, the optimal contract for l-type is the semi-separating contractĈ l in Picard (2009) . When only underwriting is used, the optimal contract is the semi-separating contractC l we solve in Proposition 2.
And with special cost parameters, we show that the semi-separating contractC l could allow for both underwriting and post-loss test, which we denote byC l . Among the four contracts, only one contract can dominate in equilibrium, namely rendering highest utility for l-type individuals, dependent on the parameters. The key tradeoff lies in the costs of the tests. We define g(c 1 ; λ) ≡ U l (C l ) for λ >λ(c 1 ) and g(c 1 ; λ) = −∞ otherwise as the utility derived from contractC l for the l-type, and f (c 2 ) ≡ U l (Ĉ l ) as that derived from contractĈ l for the l-type. Clearly, dg(c 1 ) dc 1 < 0 for λ >λ(c 1 ) and
It is shown in Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) that if a pooling contract with neither test does not upset the separating contract C * * l , the proportion of the hight risk type individuals in the market must be larger than or equal to a cutoff level, denoted by λ RS . Suppose first that λ ≥ λ RS . If contract 
. By implicit function theorem, we have which contract dominates depends on the difference between g(c 1 ) and f (c 2 ). If c 2 < f −1 (g(c 1 )), then
we obtain an equilibrium contract where both tests are used. Figure 6 visualizes the analysis above. Note that in each panel, the red solid curve stands for the pair of cost parameters (c 1 , c 2 ) at which the contract with only underwriting derives the same utility to l-type as the contract with only post-loss test. As a result, it characterizes the effect of substitution between the two tests. We can observe that underwriting is more expensive than post-loss testing:
to be able to deliver the same utility to the l-type individuals, the cost of a compatible underwriting test is lower than that of a post-loss test. This is reasonable since underwriting covers all individuals who apply for contract C l while post-loss testing only pertains to policyholders of C l who claim for coverage.
Figure 6 about here
We summarize the conclusions in the following proposition.
Proposition 4. Given contracts C * h , C * * l ,Ĉ l ,C l , andC l that are solved in Propositions 1, 2, and 3. If either c 1 = 0 or c 2 = 0, the equilibrium is a separating equilibrium with the first-best allocation where the test with no cost will be performed with probability 1. When c 1 > 0 and c 2 > 0: If 1 )) , and c 2 ≤ min f −1 (m(λ)), c * 2 , the equilibrium is a semi-separating equilibrium with 1 )) , and c 1 ≤ min g −1 (m(λ)), c * 1 , the equilibrium is a semi-separating equilibrium with
, and p 2 = 0 except for the case of (c 1 ,c 2 )
, and c 2 > c * 2 , the equilibrium is a separating equilibrium with
and c 2 > g −1 (m(λ)), the equilibrium does not exist.
Despite complicated notations, the results in Proposition 4 are quite intuitive: a contract with testing can dominate other contracts only if the cost of this test is sufficiently low. Compared with the original setup in Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) where the equilibrium exist when λ ≥ λ RS , the introduction of either underwriting or post-loss testing enlarges the range of λ such that the equilibrium can be achieved even if λ < λ RS . Note that when c 1 is larger than c * 1 , the profile section surface of (c 2 , λ) in Figure 6 is reduced into Figure 3 in Picard (2009) . And even in the region of c 2 > c * 2 and λ < λ RS , equilibrium can be established with sufficiently low underwriting cost c 1 . Hence, by introducing underwriting and post-loss testing simultaneously, we further extend the parameter space in Picard (2009) where the equilibrium exists in the region of high cost of post-loss test.
Once the dominating contract is supplied in the market, individuals of different types will take their optimal strategies accordingly and respectively. No other contracts can improve either type and make positive profit. Given the insureds' strategies, insurers will not deviate to other contracts since any deviation is not profitable. In equilibrium, testing strategies are based on the insurers' belief which is consistent with the insureds' action. The equilibrium stated in Proposition 4, therefore, is the genuine perfect Bayesian equilibrium.
Conclusion
Underwriting and post-loss testing are commonly used screening mechanisms in insurance markets.
However, due to the random and indefinite insurer-insured relationship and high turnover rate of customers in insurance companies (see Picard (2009) ), along with testing costs, the insurers may not be able to pre-commit to perform both tests when individuals apply for insurance contracts. Thus, it is of theoretical and practical importance to examine the effects of both underwriting and post-loss testing without commitment in a unified model. We build up this model in a familiar Rothschild and Stiglitz insurance market and solve it by first deriving the optimal contracts for different cases and then identifying the equilibrium by comparing the levels of utility delivered to low-risk type individuals by different contracts. In the equilibrium, whether either or both tests are used hinges on the relative magnitude of testing costs. In particular, only when the pair of cost parameters meet the rigorous conditions can both tests be used in equilibrium. In most cases, the contract for low-risk type may only incorporate the test with relatively low testing cost. Thus, the co-existence of both underwriting and post-loss testing in reality may be caused by additional reasons not analyzed in this article, such as heterogeneous risk aversion among insureds and unintentional concealment of risk types of individuals.
We show that in the semi-separating equilibrium where only underwriting is used, the insurance contract for low-risk type may be either overinsurance, full insurance, or underinsurance, dependent on the relationship between the fee charged to the misrepresenting individuals and the underwriting cost. Correspondingly, despite the mixed strategy of the high-risk type individuals, risk may be either negatively or positively correlated with coverage in our model with underwriting without commitment, which is in salient contrast to the one-side prediction in Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) and Picard (2009) . Given that testing the relationship between coverage and risk, or equivalently the existence of adverse selection, is the central topic in empirical works among insurance economists, our model provides a further factor: the difference between underwriting cost and underwriting fee, to predict this relationship. Additionally, our model suggests that when both underwriting and post-loss testing are used, the contract for low-risk type displays overinsurance while that for the high-risk type takes the form of full insurance. Potential empirical tests could be performed concerning this assertion. In summary, due to the presence of the two screening mechanisms in insurance markets, our theoretical analysis provides another answer as to why empirical research on the existence of adverse selection in insurance markets is mixed, given that underwriting and post-lose testing technology diverges among different insurance market and that the insurers may not pre-commit to perform these screening mechanisms.
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We conclude by discussing two potential extensions of our model and thus hopefully provide helpful guidance for further studies. The first recommended extension is to consider a case when contracts for both risk types being tested are updated by the insurers after they have concluded their underwriting.
An additional complication is introduced in this situation because there is potential cross-subsidies between the updated contracts as long as they are provided by the same insurer. We conjecture that the updated contract for the low-risk type would be the actuarially fairly priced contract of low-risk type, C * l , and thus, given contract C * h pervades in the market, part of the individuals in the market can achieve the first-best allocation. Our second recommendation for extensions of this work is to endogenize fee G collected from the misrepresenting individuals in underwriting, since in practice, G can be controlled by the insurers as a part of profit management. Intuitively, a larger fee may provide more incentive to the insurers to conduct underwriting but may deter high-risk type individuals to apply for the contract designed for low-risk type individuals. The present setup in our model, however, is devoid of a mechanism to specify an optimal underwriting strategy and an optimal fee simultaneously. Hence, additional tradeoff should be introduced to solve optimal fee.
In the proof of Lemma 7, we have shown that in case of p 1 > 0 and p 2 = 0 the resource constraint of contract C l is represented by equation (24), i.e. ψ(k l , x l ) = 0, which is a hyperbola on the state space. Define a transfer from (k l , x l ) to (z, y) such that
Then (24) is equivalent to:
The asymptotes of the transferred hyperbola are:
Since the mapping from (k l , x l ) to (z, y) is a bijection, two asymptotes of (24) are:
Note that σ hl =
(1−λ)c1
< 1 implies (26), which is transferred to y > c1 λ − G ≥ c 1 − G. So it is sufficient to consider the upper branch of the hyperbola in (z, y) space; see Figure A1 . In addition, the market average resource constraint Ξ(1, k l , x l ) = 0, i.e. the resource constraint when σ hl = 1, is represented by:
which intersects with the pair of hyperbola at points (0, 0) and
λ − G in (z, y) space (the red dashed line in Figure A1 ). Figure A1 about here Now, we focus on the interior solutions which is ensured by the condition λ >λ. Then the first order condition (25) holds.
If c 1 > G and σ hl < 1, the hyperbola is increasing and convex with
. Thus, the first order condition (25) implies that
If c 1 = G, the hyperbola degenerates into part of the asymptotes with z = −c 1 , y >
. So the first order condition (25) implies that
If c 1 < G, the hyperbola is decreasing and convex. And if c 1 > λG we have −c 1 < z < 
Finally, since we always have z < 0 if c 1 > 0, the resource constraint with underwriting will always below the fair-odds line of l-type, irrelevant to the magnitude of G.
Derivation of Equation (31)
By transfer (36), we have shown in the proof of Proposition 2 that Ξ(σ U (k l , x l ), k l , x l ) = 0 is equivalent to (37). With the same transfer, Ξ(σ P (k l , x l ), k l , x l ) = 0 is equivalent to:
Note that untrivial solutions to (k l , x l ) are also untrivial solutions to (z, y). So, combining (37) and (43) and cancelling out z, we have:
where a factor of z has been cancelled. If (30) has one and only untrivial solution, then the determinant of (44) must be 0, which is equation (31). Conversely, if equation (31) holds, there is unique pair (k l , x l ) = 0 such that two hyperbolas in (30) has one and only tangent point.
Proof of Proposition 3
By reasoning before Proposition 3, we have shown that problem (14) with p 1 > 0 and p 2 > 0 is equivalent to a system of equations (28), (29), and (31). Equation (28) is equivalent to
and equation (29) implies that:
Square equation (45) and divide it by equation (46), and we have that (c 1 , c 2 ) must satisfy equation 
asymptotes 21 of the hyperbola ϕ(c 1 , c 2 ) = 0 are:
And for c 1 ≥ G, the branch of hyperbola ϕ(c 1 , c 2 ) = 0 lies below (47) and above (48). IfC l is the solution to problem (14), z must be smaller than c 1 as shown in the proof of Proposition 2, i.e.
So we have
. Thus, (c 1 ,c 2 ) must be above G, Figure A2 . Figure A2 about here Conversely, we are going to show firstly that if
20 When G = 0, the hyperbola ϕ(c 1 , c 2 ) = 0 is reduced into its asymptotes presented below. 21 This can be calculated by a linear transfer:
Then two asymptotes of the transferred hyperbola are q = ±2 √ 1 − π h r.
hold, then (c 1 , c 2 ) = (c 1 ,c 2 ) solved by (34) and (35) If G > 0, (50) implies that
Since we always have (51) and (52) show that:
Thus, line c 2 =
c 1 must intersect with hyperbola ϕ(c 1 , c 2 ) = 0 at some point denoted by (c 1 ,c 2 ) above G, c 2 ) , the determinant of (44) is equal to 0. Thus, the curve of (37) must be tangent to that of (43) at some point such that z < 0. Equivalently, given (c 1 , c 2 ) = (c 1 ,c 2 ), (30) has one and only untrivial solution (k l , x l ) at which the upper branch of Ξ(σ
is tangent to the upper branch of Ξ(σ P (k l , x l ), k l , x l ) = 0. So Condition 1 is satisfied. In particular, the equation for the tangent line
Rearranging (35), we have
Since the slope of Ξ(σ
and an indifference curve of l-type that goes throughC l . Then, Condition 2 is satisfied.
. Thus, the equation for the secant line of both hyperbolas is 
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• line. Point E stands for the state where no insurance is purchased. Line EH is the fair-odds line for the h-type individuals, and line EL is that for the l-type individuals. Contract C * h is located at the tangent point of indifference curve of h-type and their fair-odds line. That indifference curve intersects with the fair-odds line of l-type at contract C * * l . C * h and C * * l are separating contracts for h-type and l-type respectively in Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) . Contract C * l is located at the tangent point of indifference curve of l-type and their fair-odds line. In this figure, W N = 100, W A = 20, π h = 0.7, π l = 0.4, and u(w) = ln(w). So C * h = (56, 24), C * l = (32, 48), and C * * l = (8.0548, 12.0821). This figure plots optimal contract with underwriting,C l , in the model in the state space of (W 1 , W 2 ).
In each panel, the dash-dot line is the 45
• line. Point E stands for the state where no insurance is purchased. Line EH is the fair-odds line for the h-type individuals, and line EL is that for the l-type individuals. The dark solid curve is the resource constraint ψ(
And the optimal contractC l is located at the tangent point of indifference curve of l-type and the budget constraint. In this figure, W N = 100, W A = 20, π h = 0.7, π l = 0.4, and u(w) = ln(w).
In Panel A, c 1 = 3 > 2 = G, the optimal contractC l = (35.3944, 45.2172) (overinsurance), and σ hl = 0.0166, p 1 = 0.5034. In Panel B, c 1 = 2 = G, the optimal contractC l = (34, 46) (full insurance), and σ hl = 0.0101, p 1 = 0.5127. And in Panel C, c 1 = 1 < 2 = G, the optimal contract C l = (32.9003, 46.9546) (underinsurance), and σ hl = 0.0046, p 1 = 0.5217. This figure plots optimal contracts with both underwriting and post-loss test,C l , in the model in the state space of (W 1 , W 2 ). The dash-dot line is the 45
• line. Point E stands for the state where no insurance is purchased. Line EH is the fair-odds line for the h-type individuals, and line EL is that for the l-type individuals. The dark solid curve is the resource constraint with underwriting Ξ(σ U (k l , x l ), k l , x l ) = 0. And the cyan solid curve is the resource constraint with post-loss test Ξ(σ P (k l , x l ), k l , x l ) = 0. The optimal contractC l is located at the tangent point between indifference curve of l-type and both resource constraints. To this end, the parameters are selected so that sufficient conditions in Proposition 3 are satisfied. In particular, in this figure, W N = 100, W A = 20, π h = 0.7, π l = 0.5, G = 2 and u(w) = ln(w). Cost parameters are solved as (c 1 ,c 2 ) = (3.9772, 13.2651), and contract for l-type isC l = (46.6434, 37.1181). Also, s = 1.0705, C * h = (56, 24), C * * l = (12.8239, 12.8239), and σ hl = 0.0441. with λ = λ RS (the gray dotted line) intersects point E and is tangent to an indifference curve that intersects contract C * * l . ForC l to be a interior solution, the market average fair-odds line must be lower than that with λ =λ . To exclude a pooling contract that may upset the separating equilibrium, the market average fair-odds line must be lower than than with λ = λ RS . Since the indifference curve of l-type that intersects C * * l is lower than that which intersectsC l , we have λ RS >λ. In this figure, W N = 100, W A = 20, π h = 0.7, π l = 0.5, G = 2, c 1 = 3 and u(w) = ln(w). We have λ RS = 0.4651 andλ = 0.2008. This figure identifies which contract dominates in the market by comparing utility of l-type that can be provided by different contracts. In particular, g(c 1 ) ≡ U l (C l ), f (c 2 ) ≡ U l (Ĉ l ), and m(λ) denotes the utility of l-type derived from a pooling contract without tests that maximizes their utility. In both panels, the red solid curve stands for the function f (c 2 ) = g(c 1 ). We set W N = 100, W A = 20, 
